17 Years Observing BGP: What Doug Madory Learned About Shutdowns, Hijacks, and Routing Security

16/11/2026

17 Years Observing BGP: What Doug Madory Learned About Shutdowns, Hijacks, and Routing Security

At LACNIC 46 LACNOG 2026, Infoblox’s Director of Internet Analysis explored how to interpret global routing patterns and provided specific actions for network operators, including the creation of ASPA records, a task that can already be performed through the MiLACNIC portal.

Seventeen years of observing BGP, the protocol through which Internet networks announce the paths to reach each destination, have left him with a notebook full of shutdowns, politically motivated traffic redirections, and attacks on Internet infrastructure. According to Doug Madory, this experience has also led him to a conclusion rarely heard in the field of security: significant progress has been made, but the fight never ends. This is the summary he shared at LACNIC 46 LACNOG 2026, held in Mendoza.

Madory divided his presentation into two parts: geopolitics and security. The first examined how governments disrupt, filter, or reroute Internet traffic; the second explored how attackers hijack routes and how the community defends itself. Both presented data corresponding to 2026, from the Internet shutdowns in Iran to an attack on a hosting software provider that occurred on August 28.

The fundamental challenge, Madory noted, is that understanding BGP dynamics is a multi-dimensional problem. His analysis of any event focuses on three questions: its reach (how far it propagated), its duration (how long it lasted), and its context (which autonomous systems were involved).

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Standard tools alone are not enough. BGPlay—which is still in use—visualizes individual routing announcements, which requires users to watch a lengthy animation before they can draw any meaningful conclusions. Simply counting announcements is also not particularly useful, as this number could mean nothing or it could mean a great deal. The number itself does not distinguish between the two.

Madory’s proposal is to shift attention from the announcements themselves to hidden status in routing tables, of which the advertisements are merely what can be observed.

From ROV to ASPA

Madory began by reviewing the basics. A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) specifies which autonomous system (i.e., an operator’s network, identified by a unique number) is authorized to announce a particular prefix. Route Origin Validation (ROV) checks routes against these authorizations and rejects those that are invalid. According to the NIST RPKI monitor, 71% of IPv4 routes and 79% of IPv6 routes have an associated ROA. Aggregated traffic data for October 2026 shows that 78% of traffic, measured in bits per second, is directed toward routes covered by an ROA.

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