The “sshole” vulnerability in OpenSSH and what the LACNIC honeynet revealed

11/11/2026

The “sshole” vulnerability in OpenSSH and what the LACNIC honeynet revealed

By Guillermo Pereyra

What if an unusually long password could give you access to an account with no password at all? It may sound like a joke, but that is exactly what made headlines in the OpenSSH community last week.

On November 5, OpenSSH released version 10.6p2 to address a critical vulnerability affecting Linux systems that use musl with PAM disabled. Known as *sshole, the flaw is identified as CVE-2026-123158 and carries a CVSS score of 8.1. It was reported by Özgün Kültekin from Wakefield.

Accounts that have no usable password contain an asterisk in /etc/shadow. According to Help Net Security, when the musl library processes a password exceeding 256 bytes, the crypt() function fails and returns an asterisk as well. When sshd compares the values, they match, and authentication succeeds.

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According to Invadel’s summary, four conditions must be met simultaneously:

  • sshd must be running on musl with PAM disabled, as is the case with Alpine’s default package.
  • Password authentication must be enabled, which is the default setting.
  • The targeted account must have exactly one asterisk in /etc/shadow.
  • Another local account must have a SHA-crypt password hash.

Distributions using glibc, such as Debian and Ubuntu, are not affected.

One distinction matters here: password-based root login is only possible if an administrator has explicitly set PermitRootLogin yes. A more realistic target is the alpine account included in official cloud images, which can obtain root privileges through doas without entering a password.

The views expressed by the authors of this blog are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of LACNIC.

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