{"id":30426,"date":"2025-08-01T17:03:08","date_gmt":"2025-08-01T17:03:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/?p=30426"},"modified":"2025-08-11T13:51:53","modified_gmt":"2025-08-11T13:51:53","slug":"why-ixps-matter-critical-infrastructure-beyond-the-hype","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/why-ixps-matter-critical-infrastructure-beyond-the-hype\/","title":{"rendered":"Why IXPs matter: Building Infrastructure Beyond the Hype"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Antonio Prado<\/a> and Flavio Luciani<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are often overlooked in discussions about critical infrastructure. Yet their role in routing stability, local resilience, and digital sovereignty is undeniable. In this article, we explore what happens when IXPs fail, and why classifying them as critical infrastructure is not just a bureaucratic formality, but a systemic necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>When IXPs fa:il real-world consequences and lessons<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>What is an IXP and why does it matter?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

An Internet Exchange Point is a physical interconnection facility where multiple Autonomous Systems (ASes) exchange IP traffic. Instead of routing traffic via expensive upstream providers, networks can peer directly, reducing cost, latency, and dependence on transit. Most IXPs consist of high-performance switching infrastructure, route servers, and optional measurement and monitoring tools. Beyond technical efficiency, IXPs support national resilience, improve user experience by keeping traffic local, and serve as critical coordination nodes in times of crisis. Yet, despite their foundational role in Internet architecture, IXPs often operate in the shadows of public awareness and policy frameworks. As a result, their vulnerabilities tend to be underestimated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>The visibility paradox<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Despite their crucial function, IXPs are often invisible in both public discourse and infrastructure policy. This “visibility paradox” creates three systemic risks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. economic optimization over resilience. Traffic is increasingly routed through major IXPs due to cost and efficiency, concentrating risk.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. dependency of smaller networks. Many small ISPs depend on a single IXP to access affordable connectivity and major content providers.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. topological centralization. A handful of physical IXP locations carry disproportionate amounts of regional traffic, creating structural vulnerabilities.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>When IXPs go down: real-world examples<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Let\u2019s examine what happens when an IXP fails. Below are real incidents that illustrate systemic dependencies on these nodes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>Kenya (KIXP): building resilience on a budget<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    In 2000, the Kenyan government attempted to block the launch of the Kenya Internet Exchange Point. Only strong advocacy from the local technical community preserved it. Since then, KIXP has reduced national transit costs by over 70% and improved routing stability despite limited resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>Sudan: total national isolation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    During the 2021<\/a>–2023<\/a> Internet shutdowns, Sudan’s lack of a robust local IXP meant that even internal traffic was cut off. The absence of domestic interconnection rendered the country completely dependent on international links, which were politically and technically severed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    Source: Cloudflare<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Brazil (IX.br): Multistakeholder-led redundancy<\/strong>*<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    Brazil\u2019s IX.br, coordinated by CGI.br, operates 35 IXP locations. During the 2020 pandemic surge, its wide geographical coverage helped absorb massive traffic increases. Its model shows that collaborative coordination and decentralization enhance systemic resilience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>Germany (DE-CIX): power failure, wide impact<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    In 2018, a power outage<\/a> at Interxion FRA5 (hosting a major DE-CIX switch) caused partial IXP failure. The resulting loss of BGP visibility affected routes across Europe. Even with built-in redundancy, this incident highlighted how dependent many ASes are on a single physical location.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>United Kingdom (LINX): wide-scale reconvergence<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    A 2021 software fault at LINX<\/a> caused traffic to reconverge at scale, hitting smaller ASes hardest. While routing recovered, the temporary instability caused degraded performance and demonstrated how IXP events cascade beyond borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>Netherlands (AMS-IX): traffic collapse<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    In November 2023, AMS-IX experienced two service interruptions<\/a> totaling over five hours. During the outage, traffic dropped from 10 Tbps to 2 Tbps. The effects were felt across European providers reliant on the exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    <\/a>Italy (MiX): national impact<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    On 12 May 2025, a fault at Milan Internet Exchange (MiX) disrupted reachability of several local services, leading to slowdowns and outages nationwide. This reinforced MiX’s critical role in Italy\u2019s Internet architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    <\/a>Takeaways<\/h3>\n\n\n\n