{"id":23286,"date":"2023-10-11T15:42:01","date_gmt":"2023-10-11T15:42:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/?p=23286"},"modified":"2024-01-09T14:11:28","modified_gmt":"2024-01-09T14:11:28","slug":"iraq-blocks-telegram-leaks-blackhole-bgp-routes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/iraq-blocks-telegram-leaks-blackhole-bgp-routes\/","title":{"rendered":"Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>By <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/author\/doug-madory\">Doug Madory<\/a>\u00a0-Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Originally published in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/iraq-blocks-telegram-leaks-blackhole-bgp-routes\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Kentik Blog<\/a> on August 10, 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Summary<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This past weekend, the government of Iraq blocked the popular messaging app Telegram, citing the need to protect Iraqi\u2019s personal data. However, when an Iraqi government network leaked out a BGP hijack used for the block, it became yet another BGP incident that was both intentional, but also accidental. Thankfully disruption was minimized by Telegram\u2019s use of RPKI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>_________________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This past weekend, the government of Iraq took the step to block the popular messaging app Telegram, citing the need to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/technology\/iraq-blocks-telegram-app-cites-personal-data-violations-2023-08-06\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">protect the personal data of Iraqi users<\/a>&nbsp;following a leak of confidential information. According to data from our friends over at Tor\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/explorer.ooni.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Open Observatory for Network Interference (OONI)<\/a>, the block was implemented by&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/explorer.ooni.org\/chart\/mat?test_name=telegram&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-07-08&amp;until=2023-08-08&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=IQ\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">blocking Telegram\u2019s IP addresses<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"825\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram-1024x825.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-23266\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram-1024x825.png 1024w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram-300x242.png 300w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram-768x619.png 768w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram-1536x1237.png 1536w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig1-blocks-telegram.png 1645w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Evidently, when the Iraqi government began blocking Telegram, it started by&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/DougMadory\/status\/1688660150087823360\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">using BGP to hijack traffic<\/a>&nbsp;destined for IP addresses associated with the messaging service, redirecting them to the proverbial bitbucket. And, as has happened before on numerous occasions, these hijack BGP routes leaked out of the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, despite this technical error, no Telegram disruption was reported outside of Iraq, in part, due to the fact that Telegram had created&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastructure#Route_Origin_Authorizations\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Route Origin Authorizations<\/a>&nbsp;(ROAs) for its routes allowing ASes outside of Iraq to automatically reject the hijacks. A ROA is a record in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastructure\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">RPKI<\/a>&nbsp;that specifies the AS origin that is authorized to originate the IP address range.<\/p>\n\n\n<section class=\"acf-view acf-view--id--21788 acf-view--object-id--23286\"><div class=\"acf-view__texto_fijo acf-view__row\"><div class=\"acf-view__texto_fijo-field acf-view__field\"><div class=\"acf-view__texto_fijo-choice acf-view__choice\">Additional reading:<\/div><\/div><\/div><div class=\"acf-view__enlace acf-view__row\"><div class=\"acf-view__enlace-field acf-view__field\"><a target=\"_self\" class=\"acf-view__enlace-link acf-view__link\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/routing\/a-brief-history-of-the-internets-biggest-bgp-incidents?utm_source=web&amp;utm_medium=blog&amp;utm_campaign=Notas+relacionadas+blog+conectividad&amp;utm_id=Notas+relacionadas+blog\">A Brief History of the Internet\u2019s Biggest BGP Incidents <\/a><\/div><\/div><\/section>\n\n\n<p><strong>Intentional, but also accidental<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Perhaps the most famous BGP hijack ever was Pakistan\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2008\/02\/pakistans-accid\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">hijack of YouTube in 2008<\/a>&nbsp;(also see&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/a-brief-history-of-the-internets-biggest-bgp-incidents\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">The Internet\u2019s Biggest BGP Incidents<\/a>). In that case, the Pakistani government ordered a block of Youtube in the country. The Pakistani state telecom, PTCL created BGP routes to hijack traffic destined for Youtube and blackhole it. However, the hijacks leaked out of Pakistan, leading to a global disruption of Youtube. Over the years, there have been many such leaks of BGP hijacks meant to censor content, such as those in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20210512142832mp_\/https:\/blogs.oracle.com\/internetintelligence\/ukraine-bans-russian-social-media\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Ukraine<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170327193134\/http:\/dyn.com\/blog\/iran-leaks-censorship-via-bgp-hijacks\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Iran<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>More recently, during the initial weeks of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/myanmar-goes-offline-during-military-coup\/\">Myanmar military coup in 2021<\/a>, the military junta in charge ordered social media to be blocked. To comply with the order, one Myanma ISP elected to use BGP in order to hijack local Twitter traffic and drop it. Unfortunately,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/myanmar-goes-offline-during-military-coup\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">their hijack route was inadvertently leaked out<\/a>&nbsp;of Myanmar, causing disruptions to Twitter around South Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And finally, last year, during Russia\u2019s crackdown on social media and independent journalism following their invasion of Ukraine, a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.itnews.com.au\/news\/russian-network-hijacked-twitter-traffic-578000\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Russian ISP elected to use BGP to blackhole traffic<\/a>&nbsp;to Twitter by hijacking the&nbsp;exact same prefix&nbsp;(104.244.42.0\/24) that was hijacked a year earlier in Myanmar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, there was a difference between the two hijacks of Twitter\u2019s 104.244.42.0\/24 by Myanmar in 2021 and then again by Russia in 2022. In the intervening year, Twitter deployed RPKI, creating ROAs in RPKI for nearly all of its routes. By doing so, it enabled ASes which reject RPKI-invalid routes to automatically reject the hijack routes, limiting the disruption to Twitter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As Twitter\u2019s CISO&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/LeaKissner\/status\/1508503164374315011\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">wrote at the time<\/a>, \u201ca bunch of the point of having security is to keep your systems from breaking all of the time\u201d and in this case, it kept a BGP hijack from breaking access to Twitter for users outside of Russia. The Russian hijack propagated&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/DougMadory\/status\/1508466367112093709\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">slightly less<\/a>&nbsp;than the hijack from Myanmar, but it is hard to directly compare since the hijacks were announced from different places on the internet, and there are numerous factors which can influence BGP route propagation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anecdotally, I would say that after my&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=hKwjq94Quhc\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">NANOG 86 presentation<\/a>&nbsp;on the internet impacts due to the war in Ukraine, one of Twitter\u2019s network engineers shared that, from a traffic standpoint, they observed significantly less disruption due to the Russian hijack. They believed the difference was due to RPKI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The recent episode in Iraq is similar to the aforementioned cases because it was a BGP incident that was intentional, but also accidental. The network accidentally leaked out a BGP hijack that they intentionally created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The hijacks from Iraq<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Except for the networks in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, all Iraqi internet service must go through&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bgp.tools\/as\/208293\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">AS208293<\/a>, a government network which serves as the country\u2019s international gateway. AS208293 normally doesn\u2019t originate any routes; it only connects the country\u2019s telecoms to international transit providers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, at 13:52 UTC on 5 August 2023, AS208293 started originating the following prefixes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table><tbody><tr><td>151.106.160.0\/19<\/td><td>95.161.64.0\/20<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>95.161.0.0\/17<\/td><td>91.108.8.0\/22<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>91.108.0.0\/18<\/td><td>91.108.4.0\/22<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>149.154.160.0\/20<\/td><td>149.154.164.0\/22<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>91.108.56.0\/22<\/td><td>149.154.160.0\/22<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>All but the first are address ranges used by Telegram. 151.106.160.0\/19 was last utilized by the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/posts\/subspace-com_we-regret-to-announce-that-effective-may-activity-6930952295824207873-2z25\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">now-defunct Subspace network<\/a>, so the reason for its inclusion is unclear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Illustrated in Kentik\u2019s BGP Route Viewer below, 149.154.160.0\/20 was originated by AS208293 and attained global circulation for two reasons. The first was that there was no competing route in circulation \u2014 149.154.160.0\/20 is \u201cless-specific\u201d to existing Telegram routes. Secondly, there was no matching ROA in RPKI to give ASes who have deployed RPKI a reason to reject it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"672\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-1024x672.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-23269\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-1024x672.png 1024w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-300x197.png 300w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-768x504.png 768w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-1536x1008.png 1536w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig2-blocks-telegram-2048x1344.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Conversely, when we look at the propagation of the corresponding \u201cmore-specific\u201d 149.154.160.0\/22, we see that nearly the entire internet believed (correctly!) that AS62041 (Telegram) was the origin. While AS208293 shows up in red in the ball-and-stick diagram along the bottom, it can hardly be seen in the upper stacked plot, which depicts route propagation by origin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"616\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-1024x616.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-23272\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-1024x616.png 1024w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-300x181.png 300w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-768x462.png 768w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-1536x925.png 1536w, https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/fig3-blocks-telegram-2048x1233.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The lack of propagation of a BGP route with AS208293 as the origin of 149.154.160.0\/22 is due to the fact that there was already an existing route to compete with (originated by AS62041), but also because the route from Iraq was&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/how-much-does-rpki-rov-reduce-the-propagation-of-invalid-routes\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">RPKI-invalid<\/a>, dramatically&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kentik.com\/blog\/how-much-does-rpki-rov-reduce-the-propagation-of-invalid-routes\/\">limiting its reach<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The challenge of measuring the positive impact of any security mechanism is that it often requires knowledge of the incidents that didn\u2019t occur as a result of its use. RPKI is no different. While it likely didn\u2019t have the potential to be another Pakistan\/YouTube incident, BGP non-events like this are what RPKI success looks like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Of course, this is little solace to the Iraqi users who must now employ a VPN to circumvent this IP-level blockage. Censoring Telegram will do little to protect the personal data of any Iraqis, but it does cut them off from a popular communication tool and source of news and information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Doug Madory\u00a0-Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik Originally published in&nbsp;Kentik Blog on August 10, 2023 Summary This past weekend, the government of Iraq blocked the popular messaging app Telegram, citing the need to protect Iraqi\u2019s personal data. However, when an Iraqi government network leaked out a BGP hijack used for the block, it became [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":23275,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[919],"tags":[1280],"archivo":[1345],"taxonomy-authors":[1418],"tipo_autor":[],"class_list":["post-23286","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-routing","tag-routing","archivo-editions","taxonomy-authors-doug-madory-en"],"acf":{"author":"","related_notes":""},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.0 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>LACNIC Blog | Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/iraq-blocks-telegram-leaks-blackhole-bgp-routes\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"LACNIC Blog | Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By Doug Madory\u00a0-Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik Originally published in&nbsp;Kentik Blog on August 10, 2023 Summary This past weekend, the government of Iraq blocked the popular messaging app Telegram, citing the need to protect Iraqi\u2019s personal data. 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Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/blog.lacnic.net\/en\/iraq-blocks-telegram-leaks-blackhole-bgp-routes\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"LACNIC Blog | Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes","og_description":"By Doug Madory\u00a0-Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik Originally published in&nbsp;Kentik Blog on August 10, 2023 Summary This past weekend, the government of Iraq blocked the popular messaging app Telegram, citing the need to protect Iraqi\u2019s personal data. 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